Bill O’Reilly falsely claimed Richard Nixon never met Mao Zedong. In fact, Nixon met with Mao in February 1972.

In the exchange, Alan Colmes played his assigned role: The dopey liberal, chastened by his conservative master.

From friend of labor to Iraq War enabler to the anti-labor US Chamber Of Commerce.

Gephardt presided over the Democratic control of the House that disintegrated into the Gingrich era, then followed that up as the Minority Leader of the Democrats who fulfilled all of George W. Bush’s dreams.

We went through this tired game already, Sirota’s just updating the names.

Christ.

UPDATE: Reynolds links, ignores (of course) my criticism of him and implies that the entire liberal blogosphere has been like this. He, as usual, doesn’t have the guts to explicitly say that. He never does.

I and some other journalists had lunch with Senator Joe Lieberman the other day and we listened to him talking about Iraq. Either Senator Lieberman is so divorced from reality that he’s completely lost the plot or he knows he’s spinning a line. Because one of my colleagues turned to me in the middle of this lunch and said he’s not talking about any country I’ve ever been to and yet he was talking about Iraq, the very country where we were sitting.

>> Note to Lieberman: The Iraqis Want A Timetable

National Journal, a weekly Washington magazine covering politics and government, asked 101 members of Congress and 137 lobbyists, former government officials and other political insiders which Democrat in Congress they most admire.

The answer: the Connecticut senator who unsuccessfully ran for president in 2004.

Of the 89 Republicans who responded, 35 percent picked Lieberman, National Journal reported in its Nov. 11 edition.

Jesus. (Not to mention Hume’s impression of a modern day Bull Connor)

We’re going to beat Michael Steele in November like the phony that he is, but not by being idiots about it.

This amoral rationalization by Jarvis has the added quality of morbid stupidity, and not only because it assumes such an argument is politically workable. In addition, Jarvis stupidly assumes that Bush anticipated an insurgency, and could therefore have explained it in advance, when all evidence points to the contrary  Bush expected a docile, thankful Iraq. Bereft of any analytical capacity, Jarvis buys into the “flypaper” theory of Iraq, that a destabilized and anarchic Iraq is in our national interest and makes us safer; a theory which is little more than a post hoc rationalization for a completely incompetent plan which failed to anticipate or plan for any unrest at all, once Iraq’s major combat units were defeated. In short, Jarvis is weirdly arguing that Bush should have made excuses for a screw up he failed to anticipate.