Dugger Translation Service:

This

“Yes, we drove the car off the cliff, but I don’t hear anything from you except complaints! What’s your plan for getting us out of this mess?”

actually means:

I dunno.

If you can’t understand that perfectly simple metaphor, translation service must be broken.

Dugger got no points to make so Dugger will spout crap.

Do I nee to remind you about Japan’s treatment of the Koreans during WWII:

“Japan – reveal the truth! Admit the crime! Officially apologise! Punish the criminals!” South Korean protesters chant every Wednesday outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.

In their midst, a small group of elderly women sit silently.

They are the survivors of the brutal, Asia-wide system of sex slaves for the Imperial Japanese Army, which the military government encouraged and helped to operate for 13 years, from 1932 until the end of World War II in 1945.

They were euphemistically called “comfort women”. But experts like Korean American scholar Edward Chang of the University of California say the network of “comfort stations” were actually officially-sanctioned rape camps.

Many of the women were even killed as part of an attempt to cover up the crime.

“There should be no time limit on prosecuting these crimes against humanity,” Prof Chang said.

And that’s from the South Koreans!

And did you forget about the abductions?

The idea that we should put Japan in charge of negotiating with the North Koreans — “by necessity” — makes no sense whatsoever.

Um, Dugger, the last time I checked Japan lacks any kind of offensive military power. That sort of lessens their ability to play the kind of hardball necessary to make diplomacy work.

Also, you seem to have completely forgotten that North Korea and our involvement there predates our troubles in Iraq. Remember we fought a war in Korea that has never been officially declared over? Remember that’s why we still have, you know, about 30,000 troops in South Korea?

To suggest that all of a sudden North Korea is someone else’s problem is sheer idiocy. Seriously.

That damned elusive Dugger wins again.

Dugger Translation Service:

This

“Yes, we drove the car off the cliff, but I don’t hear anything from you except complaints! What’s your plan for getting us out of this mess?”

actually means:

I dunno.

frame, I hate to ruin your day, but I don’t disagree w/last post addressed to me. N Korea is very bad and undoubtedly a player in WW terroism. My other points tand and I don’t think Bush should go too heavy in the Far East. Let Japan wrestle with it – by necessity.

Now, how long ago was it they threw out the inspectors? What has the current gang in DC done about it since then?

I mean, other than call ‘em names…

Um, Marty, try reading along again slowly:

On October 4, 2002, the United States suddenly confronted North Korea with a damning accusation: that it was secretly developing a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade, in violation of the 1994 agreement that Pyongyang had signed with Washington to freeze its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Since North Korea had cheated, the Bush administration declared, the United States was no longer bound by its side of the deal. Accordingly, on November 14, 2002, the United States and its allies suspended the oil shipments they had been providing North Korea under the 1994 agreement. Pyongyang retaliated by expelling international inspectors and resuming the reprocessing of plutonium, which it had stopped under the 1994 accord (known as the Agreed Framework). The confrontation between North Korea and the United States once more reached a crisis level

Much has been written about the North Korean nuclear danger, but one crucial issue has been ignored: just how much credible evidence is there to back up Washington’s uranium accusation? Although it is now widely recognized that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the intelligence data it used to justify the invasion of Iraq, most observers have accepted at face value the assessments the administration has used to reverse the previously established U.S. policy toward North Korea.

But what if those assessments were exaggerated and blurred the important distinction between weapons-grade uranium enrichment (which would clearly violate the 1994 Agreed Framework) and lower levels of enrichment (which were technically forbidden by the 1994 accord but are permitted by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and do not produce uranium suitable for nuclear weapons)?

A review of the available evidence suggests that this is just what happened.
Relying on sketchy data, the Bush administration presented a worst-case scenario as an incontrovertible truth and distorted its intelligence on North Korea (much as it did on Iraq), seriously exaggerating the danger that Pyongyang is secretly making uranium-based nuclear weapons. This failure to distinguish between civilian and military uranium-enrichment capabilities has greatly complicated what would, in any case, have been difficult negotiations to end all existing North Korean nuclear weapons programs and to prevent any future efforts through rigorous inspection. On June 24, 2004, the United States proposed a new, detailed denuclearization agreement with North Korea at six-party negotiations (including the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea) in Beijing. Before discussions could even start, however, the Bush administration insisted that North Korea first admit to the existence of the alleged uranium-enrichment facilities and specify where they are located. Pyongyang has so far refused to confirm or deny whether it has such facilities; predictably, the U.S. precondition has precluded any new talks …

What an idiot.

Um, Dugger, North Korea is deeply involved in the geo-politcs of the middle east. Pakistan and North Korea have a history of arms dealng that goes back
30 years[PDF from the Congressional Research Service]:

In October 2002, the United States confronted North Korea about its alleged
clandestine uranium enrichment program. Soon after, the Agreed Framework
collapsed, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S. intelligence officials claimed Pakistan
was a key supplier of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, and some
media reports suggested that Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge enrichment
technology for North Korean help in developing longer range missiles.
U.S. official statements leave little doubt that cooperation occurred …
The roots of cooperation are deep. North Korea and Pakistan have been engaged in conventional arms trade for over thirty years.

Ya, focus is important and the Bush administration has been focussed on the wrong players for five years.

Look it up.

Bush disengaged the US from diplomatic talks with North Korea, named them enemy and drove them into a frenzy to get nuclear weapons.

Marty wants to know what we got in return for helping N. Korea with nuclear energy, how about an absence of nuclear weapons. Doh!

Usually you all have a snappy answer. But you’ve all seemed to have passed on my question. (And don’t blame me for invoking “he who must not be mentioned.” You can blame pidge for that.)

Anyone agree with pidge’s unseemly statement? Let’s try this again-

Pidge: “…if Bush had maintained what Clinton had in place instead of driving North Korea towards Nukes, there would be no problem.”

Uh, pidge? Are you serious? Are you saying that DPRK was complying with the agreement with the “he that must not be mentioned” administration? You know- back when we helped them with nuclear energy in exchange for…

“Yes, we drove the car off the cliff, but I don’t hear anything from you except complaints! What’s your plan for getting us out of this mess?”

The issue I addressed was focus – by which I mean a preponderance of of interest – as opposed to concern. We can be concerend about a lot, but what we focus on is more important. Again, the weight of the WW terorrist movement is Mideastern in origin, the Mideast is a key source of our oil; we have a special concern for Israel; and there is not another strong, responsible power close by in the Mideast who could do something from a position of strength. In the Far east, Japan and China are right there.

The calculation on Iraq is about 1,200,000 deaths under Saddam (Iran/Iraq war, genocide of Kurds, domestic exceutions) versus about 55,000 in Iraq after Saddam. Saddam became presdient in 1979. Do the math. If one is going to use deaths as a measure, better do your homework.

In fact I would guess 3 times more Iraqis are dying now than they were under the last 10 years of Husseins regime.

Well now even I in the depths of my leftist mental disease wouldnt suggest the disparity to be that great, but my understanding (based on numbers which, I have to confess, I cant readily find at this moment) is that the numbers are about the same. This says to me at least that, if the safety of the Iraqis themselves were a critical reason for the necessity of this war, that we are failing to solve that problem. However, I note, dugger, that you have not really provided an objective measure by which we can evaulate the success of the war in/on iraq/terror, save this disparity, for which there is basically no simple count (I dont think Saddam liked census takers counting the people he killed or something) and which is, frankly, I feel weighted way to heavily given that it doesnt reflect simply his brutality to his own people but also includes the deaths in various wars, waged by and against him. As I point out, since the first gulf war the death rate is about equivalent with what it is now. Not a measurable improvement in my book. Perhaps you know of another?
Also, are you saying I’m a “hyperventilating, anti-intellectual, nasty name calling” type of person? Honestly, why? I havent called you a name, I dont believe I’m hyperventillating, and fail to see how I’m approaching this argument from anything other than an academic viewpoint, trying to weigh the facts against each other. Could you please show me where I have behaved this way? I am as ever, always eager to improve.

Dugger, it’s been clear for some time now that not even the facts have the power to change your opinion.

Case in point. Above, you wrote this: “For instance, why shoulrd we be focused on N Korea – when China and Japan are closer and have astronger vested interest? Answer that.”

The answer is clear but you’re not going to like it. We need to be concerned about North Korea for all the reasons we were told that we needed to be concerned about Iraq: They have nuclear weapons and technology that they might give to terrorist groups who would be willing to use them on the US.

Turns out Iraq had no such capability but North Korea did. Interestingly enough, our focus on Iraq did two things. It limited our ability to craft an effective policy towards North Korea while encouraging North Korea to pursue a more belligerent stance. By invading Iraq, which had no weapons of mass destruction, we essentially sent North Korea the message that they should ramp up their nuclear program as a deterrent.

That’s just one of the many reasons why Bush’s war on terror in Iraq has made the world less safe.

But what to do now? Well, the only thing we can do: apply food and economic sanctions until the North Korean regime says uncle, then, be willing to give them aid if and when they meet our demands.

The main thing, however, is that we also have to be honest brokers
ourselves:

On October 4, 2002, the United States suddenly confronted North Korea with a damning accusation: that it was secretly developing a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade, in violation of the 1994 agreement that Pyongyang had signed with Washington to freeze its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Since North Korea had cheated, the Bush administration declared, the United States was no longer bound by its side of the deal. Accordingly, on November 14, 2002, the United States and its allies suspended the oil shipments they had been providing North Korea under the 1994 agreement. Pyongyang retaliated by expelling international inspectors and resuming the reprocessing of plutonium, which it had stopped under the 1994 accord (known as the Agreed Framework). The confrontation between North Korea and the United States once more reached a crisis level

Much has been written about the North Korean nuclear danger, but one crucial issue has been ignored: just how much credible evidence is there to back up Washington’s uranium accusation? Although it is now widely recognized that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the intelligence data it used to justify the invasion of Iraq, most observers have accepted at face value the assessments the administration has used to reverse the previously established U.S. policy toward North Korea.

But what if those assessments were exaggerated and blurred the important distinction between weapons-grade uranium enrichment (which would clearly violate the 1994 Agreed Framework) and lower levels of enrichment (which were technically forbidden by the 1994 accord but are permitted by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and do not produce uranium suitable for nuclear weapons)?

A review of the available evidence suggests that this is just what happened.
Relying on sketchy data, the Bush administration presented a worst-case scenario as an incontrovertible truth and distorted its intelligence on North Korea (much as it did on Iraq), seriously exaggerating the danger that Pyongyang is secretly making uranium-based nuclear weapons. This failure to distinguish between civilian and military uranium-enrichment capabilities has greatly complicated what would, in any case, have been difficult negotiations to end all existing North Korean nuclear weapons programs and to prevent any future efforts through rigorous inspection. On June 24, 2004, the United States proposed a new, detailed denuclearization agreement with North Korea at six-party negotiations (including the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea) in Beijing. Before discussions could even start, however, the Bush administration insisted that North Korea first admit to the existence of the alleged uranium-enrichment facilities and specify where they are located. Pyongyang has so far refused to confirm or deny whether it has such facilities; predictably, the U.S. precondition has precluded any new talks …

The administration’s underlying mistake–in the case of the North Korean uranium mystery, as in Iraq–has been treating a worst-case scenario as revealed truth.

In applying it’s 1 percent doctrine to North Korea the Bush administration deliberately sabotaged diplomatic efforts that could have worked all so Bush could appear tough.

What a bunch of “doers”.