The state of intelligence was apparently speculative, weak and in some instances at least, unreliable when the administration began making the dire warnings about Iraq and WMD s. Was the president so insulated that he didn t know that the intel was speculative? Were others in his administration to afraid to bring the point up with him? Was everyone so afraid of Iraq that they discounted the speculative nature of the CIA s findings? Was new and better intel uncovered? What changed so that the narrative that Tenet felt the intelligence was a  slam dunk is believable? That s the point I ve been trying to make and the question I have been asking you  not that Bush shouldn t turn to the CIA or trust the CIA. But rather, in the context of the narrative that Tenet said the intel was a  slam dunk, it doesn t make sense nor should it be used to prove anything about what Bush believed or didn t believe before he made the decision to go to war.

You seemed to suggest, at least in your earlier posts that this December meeting was pivotal in Bush s final decision to go to war. And it s also implicit from your posts that you believe that even if Bush and others were making misleading or innaccurate statements up to that point, that this meeting made the ultimate decision to go to war ok.

I’m looking at a pile of dead horse. How about you?

- I used “slam dunk” as a summary of what Tenet reported to Bush over the months…before and after the December meeting. I don’t know exactly when he said what, of course, but I think it’s quite clear that he believed all along that Iraq had WMD (probably because, among other reasons, he was fairly certain they had or were working on them in 1998, they weren’t completely destroyed, and Saddam never accounted for their destruction.)

In earlier posts I did suggest the meeting was a “final check.” That was before I reviewed the timeline. I now see that Bush was preparing for the UN presentation rather than the invasion. The point is moot, however, because this meeting was one of many at which Tenet presented WMD-related intelligence to Bush. You want to attach great significance to the fact that Tenet gave Bush frequent (daily, in fact) briefings, as if to suggest that there was never a firm and believable answer until the very end. I don’t see it that way…I see it as a continuous series of updates on a critical issue. Imagine the CEO of a shipping company asking, “Are we still having trouble at that railhead?” What, he didn’t know that he was having trouble at that railhead? Why else would he ask unless he didn’t know?

My original point (before we got off track) was the case for believing the Tenet story being true was weak.

You may consider the case weak now, after we’ve had 150,000 troops crawling all over the place, and after we’ve learned more about the people we got the information from. But you haven’t shown why Bush should have, back then, believed some other source over his own senior intelligence executive, nor have you suggested who he should have turned to for a better assessment. I suspect that virtually all sources you might mention (and please do so, if you care to) were known to and evaluated by Tenet’s people, so the question still is, why would Bush believe anyone else over Tenet, without benefit of everything we know now?

My original point (before we got off track) was the case for believing the Tenet story being true was weak. The case for not trusting what the Bush administration said about the necessity of going to war (and for disbelieving this story), is strong especially in light of the misleading statements it had apparently been making all along. That Tenet would come along with his “slam dunk” remarks seems to pat, convenient and scripted to make logical sense.

Sure a lot of good intelligence is wrong. But there is a big difference between relying on flawed intelligence that we don’t know is flawed and manipulating intelligence to suit the needs of an administration. A good case can be made that the Bush administration was guilty of that sort of manipulation.

what is behind this statement if it was made and what was known to change the speculative intel that the administration had been relying on for months to a  slam dunk ? Apparently you don t know.

I don’t think that quote, if it actually occurred, changed ANYTHING. I think it was a reiteration of what the intelligence had been all along. I don’t think Tenet ever told Bush that “We speculate that they might have WMD. I don’t think you know either, so unless you can explain why Tenet told Bush what he did, then sat behind Powell while he presented it to the world, then I don’t see how you can make a case that Powell presented anything other than the best assessment that Tenet had available. The fact is, a lot of GOOD INTELLIGENCE is “speculative.” Pieces of information are collected bit by bit, here and there, until one or many analysts are able to put it together to form a whole picture. Much of the related material is discounted as false. Much of it is meaningless in and of itself.

I get the feeling you’re trying to convince me the intelligence was wrong, while I’m trying to convince you the President should rely on the CIA. Granted, there may have been holes in their analysis or sources or whatever, but while Bush has little experience with those matters, Tenet certainly was very confident in his information, meaning that, as an intelligence professional, he had already considered the simple questions that you suggested Bush should have asked. I would suggest to you that the CIA Director knew the importance of validating sources and weighing differing possible versions of the assessment. Whatever he saw, he was confident that the indication was that Iraq had WMD, and that’s what he shared with the President. Whether the intelligence was right or wrong, I doubt Bush could have asked any simple question, as you proposed, that would have made Tenet say, “You know Mr. President, I hadn’t thought of that. I’ll have to go check that out.” In reality, Tenet would have simply explained his reasoning behind why such a point was either pivotal or irellevant.

Nevertheless, I have seen no indication that Tenet ever told Bush anything other than that Iraq had WMD.

Phew. Yes. Back to the topic at hand, eh?

This whole long discussion started over Oliver’s post which talks about the many ways in which Bush administration (and Iraq war) supporters point to the actions of the Clinton administration to justify the belief that Iraq was hiding WMD.

Tenet was, indeed, one source of information on that (regardless of what we separately believe about the “slam dunk” meeting). So was the intelligence consensus inherited from the Clinton administration. There were also many other sources of information available to Mr. Bush and his advisors. Some of that information was conflicting in nature. Some of the information used was of dubious reliability or origin.

A very narrow set of facts was offered to the American public to justify the invasion of Iraq. We’re learning, by way of the Fitzgerald investigation, that an aggressive campaign was waged to discredit critics of the Bush administration’s argument for war.

Let me summarize as plainly as I can:
–the Bush administration ignored intelligence information that didn’t support its argument for war
–the Bush administration didn’t give the American public all the facts
–the Bush administration targeted public figures who disputed the limited facts offered.

You can argue that these assertions are wrong. But I think there’s enough publicly available information to make each assertion worth examining.

That’s why I think Sen. Roberts should keep his promises and proceed with Phase II of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation. We deserve to know how intelligence information was used to decide on an invasion and how it was used to convince the American public and the world that the invasion was justified.

Bush was getting daily intelligence briefings from Tenet. The single quote, “slam dunk,” is a convenient summary of Tenet’s information on this subject, but it would be foolish to suggest that those two words were the sum total of his input to the President over those months. Had I known you would cling to those as Bush’s only information, I would have skipped them and just stated the simple fact that Tenet had briefed Bush over a period of months that Saddam still had WMD. Sorry to have wasted your time.

Quaker:

I don t think that Tenet was saying  slam dunk to try to convince Bush that the evidence of WMD in Iraq was solid. I think he was trying to convince Bush that the presentation of evidence was believable to the public.

An interesting possibility. Nevertheless, I have seen no indication that Tenet ever told Bush anything other than that Iraq had WMD.

He wanted to included basic facts in simple terms, so that  Joe Everyman, or some such phrase, could understand it.

There you go.

My personal opinion is that the “slam dunk” discussion actually happened, but its purpose was something different from what is usually assumed.

And I think you’ve named the real purpose exactly.

I don’t think that Tenet was saying “slam dunk” to try to convince Bush that the evidence of WMD in Iraq was solid. I think he was trying to convince Bush that the presentation of evidence was believable to the public. (I think the words “Joe Sixpack” were reportedly used.)

That casts the conversation in an entirely different light, doesn’t it?

BTW, I’ve actually argued this by email with Somerby. He disagrees with me wholeheartedly. He says that Woodward’s account purports to show Bush taking a hard look at the substance of the argument, not its presentation. Somerby prefers to believe that Woodward is uncritically passing along pretty stories told to him by administration insiders.

As we’ve discussed earlier in this thread, that explanation doesn’t satisfy me.

You may very well be right. Two quick points:

Other than the alleged statement of Tenet what changed?

I didn’t suggest that anything had changed. I think he got more or less the same answer every time he was briefed (which, as far as I know, was every day.)

And I hope you re not saying that we went to war when the intelligence was speculative simply because Tenet said  slam dunk and no one in the administration checked it out.

First of all, a “slam dunk” does not indicate to me a speculative case. Also, how should someone in the administration check out intelligence, if not by asking the Central Intelligence Agency? Bush has been accused of pre-9/11 inaction because of memos or reports here and there, selected post-attack from among other memos and reports regarding events that never came to pass. But on this issue you apparently want Bush to IGNORE what he was told face to face by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in no uncertain terms. As for what you think Tenet really said or did or believed, don’t forget that he sat directly behind Powell during the brief to the U.N. What do you suppose that means?

Those weren’t quick points after all.

Quaker…

Why on earth would Bush present the case for 10 solid weeks and only then tell Tenet the case was weak?

Bush didn’t tell Tenet the case was weak. He told Tenet that the brief he had just heard, given by someone other than Tenet, was weak. He wanted to included basic facts in simple terms, so that “Joe Everyman,” or some such phrase, could understand it. I think in this and other things you and others have said, you are failing to differentiate between what Bush says in a public address and what he does behind the scenes or in official forums to plan and execute the war. Two very different sets of requirements.

I did enjoy your fantasy, though.

I’m trying to figure out how you get to your belief that the agency assured the president each time that Iraq did in fact have WMD’s (especially on the “eve of war”, in your words.) Other than the alleged statement of Tenet what changed? And I hope you’re not saying that we went to war when the intelligence was speculative simply because Tenet said “slam dunk” and no one in the administration checked it out. I’d hate to be your skydiver in that situation.

Here’s what I can’t put together from your comments.

In the 10 weeks from the Cincinnati speech until just before Christmas, 2002, Mr. Bush and others in the White House repeatedly told us that we knew Saddam had WMD, that there were high level connections between Iraq and terrorist groups, and that Saddam was close to gaining a nuculer weapon.

After making speech after speech in public about this for 10 straignt weeks, Mr. Bush steps back and says, “Hunh. Better make sure I’m right about this.”

Let’s accept that for a moment.

What that would mean is that the Bush administration spent 10 weeks making a case for an invasion based on facts they weren’t sure of!

Is that really your position?

Is it your position that, after being given the inital assessment however many months before, Bush should never have consulted Tenet on the matter again?

No.

Neither is it my position that Mr. Bush was seeking “assurance” that the facts he presented to the public were, in fact, accurate.

I think it was you who first suggested that “assurance” was his purpose.

It is my position that this explanation of Mr. Woodward’s account is implausible.

What that would mean is that the Bush administration spent 10 weeks making a case for an invasion based on facts they weren t sure of!

Is that really your position?

Is it your position that, after being given the inital assessment however many months before, Bush should never have consulted Tenet on the matter again?

This is a pointless debate. The President consulted the CIA about WMD numerous times over many months, and was assured each time that Iraq had them. End of story.

The brief occured on 21 December, 2002. The invasion began 20 March, 2003, or about 90 days later. For an operation designed to remove a government, occupy a country, and establish a democracy, I feel comfortable calling the “D-90″ point “the eve of war.” You may save that term for 19 March, but I don’t think most people involved in planning would.

At any rate, in looking up those dates I learned that Tenet gave his brief in preparation for Powell’s presentation to the U.N rather than for the invasion. My point stands…Bush was assured by the agency responsible for intelligence that Iraq did indeed have WMD.

October – December, 2002: Bush and other administration members aggressively make the case that Saddam is a threat and invasion may be justified.

December 21, 2002: Bush seeks assurance from Tenet that the evidence on WMD is accurate. Tenet responds saying, “Well, now we’re not so sure.”

December 22, 2002: Bush goes to the American people and says: “Maybe we were wrong. We’re going to give the inspectors more time. Merry Christmas. Peace on Earth. Goodwill to men. Except Saddam……Kidding! Saddam too!”

OK, I got carried away with the 12/22 fantasy.

But I don’t think Bush would have put himself in a position to have to step back from the case he had been building for 10 weeks by waiting until December for “assurance” that the evidence on WMD was correct. Remember, Woodward’s account has Bush challenging Tenet that the case is weak.

Why on earth would Bush present the case for 10 solid weeks and only then tell Tenet the case was weak?