’)The right tried their damndest to undo President Clinton’s election and re-election, but now all of a sudden are invoking his name to shield themselves from the Iraqi war fallout.
Dave Johnson explains why Iraq didn’t have any WMDs and the wisdom of the 42nd president.
Dave Johnson conveniently forgets this, which according to my calender is in 2003. You know, after the bombing campaign.
Johnsons claim that all of Iraq’s WMD capabilities were wiped out in a massive 4 day bombing campaign are ridiculous and without substance. I have several questions for you Oliver; 1) Does Johnson have any support for this claim? 2) Without inspectors on the ground between the withdrawl and just prior to the invasion, how do you substantiate this claim? 3) Four days of bombing wiped out one of the largest weapons caches in the world (after Hussein had several years to hide and bomb proof the facilities after the first gulf war)? 4) How do account for all of the statements made by prominent Democrats on the Intelligence Committees (with access to the same itell. as the Pres.) in the run up to the war?
Iraq didn’t have a nuclear program, or even ambitions for one. Congress never would have approved the war resolution if all Saddam had was mustard gas, and he didn’t even have that. But honestly guys, I feel a lot of pity for you right now, having to go through your days with that awful gnaqing realization that Michael Moore was right, and you were wrong.
5) Why would the CIA Director appointed by President Clinton tell his second boss, President Bush, that it was a “slam dunk” that Iraq had WMD?
Um, 150,000 troops on the ground haven’t found any?
gnawing, not gnaqing.
Quaker…
I believe question 2 referred to the period of time between the withdrawal of the inspectors in the invasion. Maybe we could have sent 150,000 inspectors during that period to learn what we know now, but it would have been hard to sell it as anything but an invasion.
Maybe.
That depends on how you read zorro’s question, I guess:
By “this claim,” I took him to mean this:
My response would be that time didn’t end with the invasion. Since then, we have the benefit of three years of total access to every nook and cranny in Tikrit and north and east and west and south somewhat.
If you want to parse it your way, then the answer is: inspectors were allowed back in just prior to the invasion, Mr. Bush’s pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding. Members of the Bush administration mounted a vigorous campaign to discount and discredit their reports.
Since then, we’ve learned those reports were correct.
It is quite interesting that both sides of the debate characterize events leading to military action in Iraq as,’ “the run up to war”.
Was the haste due to the administrations fear of immediate danger from Saddam, or the immediate danger of their cover story falling apart?
Regarding zorro’s assertion (and a main talking point of the right that the Senate had the same intel as the president) two quotes:
1. From Dianne Feinstein, a member of the intelligence committee, said yesterday: “Had I known then what I know now, I never would have have cast that vote, not in a thousand years.” and,
2. From Paul Begala “First off, the White House is who provides the intelligence to the Congress and the notion that the Congress sees the same intelligence as the president is nonsense. I used to work in the White House and I used to work on the Congress. I can tell you, presidents and this president especially, treats Congress like a mushroom factory, keeps them in the dark and feeds them manure.”
Scratch’s point (another right wing fav) is interesting because it appears that no one other than Bob Woodward whose sources were the administration has verified if Tenet actually said that the case of Iraq having WMD’s was a “slam dunk”. The briefing where the statement was made allegedly occurred in December of 2002. As Bob Somerby makes clear, “…what s the striking thing about that December briefing? The fact that it occurred in December! The press corps knows how to play this item: Tenet gave Bush a lousy briefing, and the wise president said to do better. But everyone knows not to mention the obvious. At the time this briefing occurred, Bush and Cheney had already spent four months making flat statements about the intelligence. Why was Bush being briefed in December when his statements had started that fall?….Do you mind if we tell you the truth? Woodward s book is full of scripts scripts that flatter a bold, daring president. (Such may be the price of full access.) The December briefing is one such narration. Tenet is the fall guy here, brought up short by an eagle-eyed president. And everyone knows not to ask the obvious: Why was this president making unequivocal statements long before this briefing occurred?”
Oliver’s post referred to a post by Dave Johnson at Seeing the Forest. Dave added an update to refer to this post at Slactivist.
Recommended for kids of all ages, both left and right.
I’ve said before that Clinton should get credit for presiding over Saddam’s disarmament. Too bad Bush refused to allow the inspectors time to confirm this fact before commencing shock ‘n’ awe.
Dave M.
Why was this president making unequivocal statements long before this briefing occurred?
My understanding is that the President believed firmly WELL BEFORE this brief that Iraq had WMD. I don’t think anyone claims that Bush learned* in this brief that Iraq had WMD. Rather, this was when Bush was going over his position for the war, and had asked Tenet for an assurance that we were absolutely sure that they did in fact have WMD. That’s when Tenet gave his unequivocal assurances.
*meaning of asterisk is obvious
BushCo was told by Italian Secret Service that Niger docs no good in Jan. 2003.
The crack widens inch by inch.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9912352/
Bush believed firmly that Hussein had WMDs but he still needed absolute assurance that his firm beliefs were firm enough? Ya. Okay.
Precisely Dave’s point.
The “slam dunk meeting took place in the White House on December 21, 2002.
Why would Bush be asking for this assurance ten weeks after his speech in Cincinnati where he declared to all of America:
In that speech, Bush went into great detail, charging that Iraq had produced chemical and biological weapons and had restarted its nuclear weapons program.
Why on earth would he make that speech–which was carefully vetted by the CIA–and then come back ten weeks later for “assurance” that it was all true?
Doesn’t make sense.
In other words, why, if Bush needed absolute assurances at that late date, didn’t he let the inspections continue? What could Tenet tell him that inspectors on the ground couldn’t? Why couldn’t Tenet communicate his information to the inspectors to help them search? Why was the American public being told with certainty that Iraq had WMDs when the president still had some inkling of doubt? Why did none of it turn out to be true?
My favorite Republican talking point is the one for the real dead enders, the ones who argue that all of Iraqs weapons are now in Syria or somewhere else. These are the guys so desperate to defend the president that they can’t even see the damage they’re doing to their cause. Bush let the weapons get away? Way to go guys.
Quaker…
Why on earth would he make that speech which was carefully vetted by the CIA and then come back ten weeks later for assurance that it was all true? Doesn t make sense.
It makes perfect sense. He was in the final stages of planning for an invasion. That is a very different context than making a policy speech.
You and others may not be able to understand this if you have taken the position that Bush knew the facts all along and that he was going to war no matter what. People with such a belief, who obviously abound on this site, cannot look at such a simple act as asking for final confirmation on a critical issue before going to war and see that it makes perfect sense.
Let’s check the alternate universe machine…Yes, I see that Bush didn’t ask for confirmation, and there’s a raging debate on OW complaining that Bush didn’t even bother to double check with the CIA to ensure that the intelligence assesment hadn’t changed prior to the invasion.
Frame…
What could Tenet tell him that inspectors on the ground couldn t? Why couldn t Tenet communicate his information to the inspectors to help them search?
Saddam had been playing shell games with inpectors and other agencies for a decade. People on the ground can sometimes provide the best intelligence, but not always.
And you really think the CIA wasn’t providing information to the inspectors? Why else would they be going to specific buildings and facilities to inspect? Because of interviews with scientists who feared for their lives or who were loyal to Saddam? Because of maps and guides provided by Saddam? What do you think the CIA did, make an assessment and then just let the inspectors wander around and hope that they ran into something?
“Saddam had been playing shell games with inpectors and other agencies for a decade. People on the ground can sometimes provide the best intelligence, but not always.”
So was providing our best intelligence? Iraqi defectors and dissidents who hadn’t been in the country for years? People who had agendas of their own and needed the US to carry them out? There’s good reason to believe that the Bush administration listened to only those sources it wanted to to listen to and ignored everything else. You can see this in the Niger/uranium story, the aluminum tube story, the supposed Prague meeting between 9-11 plotters and Iraqi agents and the list of bogus claims goes on.
Scratch you miss the point. The fact of the matter is I don t know if Tenet actually said what he is alleged to have said. The problem is that no one other than Bob Woodward who got his information from administration sources, says this event happened. What I am saying in agreement with Somerby is that the timing and circumstances under which this quote allegedly occurred makes it suspect. You, and others on the right apparently take it as an article of faith that this event and those words were in fact spoken. You take as an article of faith and cite it (as you did here) as proof that Iraq had WMD s or at least that Bush and his administration were justified in saying they did. It s another piece of evidence you seem to claim, showing how careful Bush was in taking us to war and that any failure in that decision wasn t his fault, but rather Tenet s in this case. You take this as an article of faith despite the fact that months before this alleged statement was made Bush, Cheney and others in the administration were making unequivocal claims that Iraq had WMD s, were developing nuclear weapons, and could launch a chemical or biological attack within 45 minutes. I m saying in agreement with Somerby, that it s suspect and shouldn t be used as proof in the manner you used it.
By the way, the claim that after months of making unequivocal claims that Iraq had WMD s in the press, in speeches and on TV which had the (ddesired) effect of raising the public s level of apprehension and desire to go to war to rid the world of the Iraqi menace that Bush suddenly wanted to be sure of his facts is unconvincing to say the least.
Frame…
Um, Scratch, then why didn t the inspectors find everything the CIA said was there?
Well, it appears that the CIA was wrong!
But that’s not the point I was arguing…I was saying that it made perfect sense for the President to consult the CIA Director for confirmation of earlier intelligence reports. Again, let’s look at the alternative…the inspectors say they haven’t encountered any WMD, Bush believes them and doesn’t consult with Tenet for confirmation of earlier reports from the agency responsbile for intelligence saying Iraq had WMD. No invasion, then an attack of some sort using Iraqi WMD. Please, for the love of god, and in light of the attacks on administration “failures” before 9/11, can we at least agree that Bush would have been attacked yet again for NOT ASKING FOR CONFIRMATION FROM TENET?
So who was providing our best intelligence? Iraqi defectors and dissidents who hadn t been in the country for years?
Well, that’s probably the problem, we know now. But again…the Director of the CIA comes into the Oval Office, says it a “Slam Dunk” (or, even if you don’t believe that account, certainly did not refute previous reports,) and you want Bush to do his own intelligence analysis, including source validation and all that, to come up with his own individual intelligence assessment? Please.
Um, Scratch, then why didn’t the inspectors find everything the CIA said was there? Besides, read this:
“Prior to the invasion, the White House convened a series of working groups, and Foley was on the one that dealt with the threat posed to U.S. forces by Iraq’s alleged WMD stocks. More than one member of the high-level group groused that it was extremely hard to get Foley to reveal exactly what the agency had on Iraq’s WMD. U.N. chief inspector Hans Blix had the same problem. All he could get from the CIA was a list of sites that were already well known from the United Nations’ own inspection teams. At Central Command, this lack of hard information produced real problems. The Pentagon needed to know where Saddam’s WMD stockpiles were, and what exactly was inside them, so they could plan to destroy them. After intense pressure, the CIA finally produced what one top administration official touted as “the crown jewels” satellite photos of buildings. But the CIA admitted that it didn’t know what was inside the buildings. “I’m coming to the conclusion that the agency really knew very little, but didn’t feel it could admit that to anyone,” says an insider deeply involved in one of the internal probes into the mess.”
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4125721/site/newsweek/
Dave: I only make two claims in this thread.
1) It is not unreasonable for the President, on the eve of war, to check with the CIA Director for yet another confirmation of intelligence, no matter what assurances have been given in the past. Just like a skydiver checking his rig one last time before he jumps. Among other things, something might have changed since the last assurance.
2) It is not unreasonable for the President to believe what the Director says.
scratch -
Unfortunately, the Tenet incident didn’t occur on the “eve of war” any more than the other comments about Iraq WMD’s did. (Tenet allegedly made the “slam dunk” comment in December, the Iraq war started in March). It doesn’t appear that Bush felt the need to obtain final assurances (like your hypothetical skydiver) about the intelligence that he was using to take us to war after all.
I have an idea. Let’s see what the account would have looked like if Tenet had not said, “slam dunk!”
October – December, 2002: Bush and other administration members aggressively make the case that Saddam is a threat and invasion may be justified.
December 21, 2002: Bush seeks assurance from Tenet that the evidence on WMD is accurate. Tenet responds saying, “Well, now we’re not so sure.”
December 22, 2002: Bush goes to the American people and says: “Maybe we were wrong. We’re going to give the inspectors more time. Merry Christmas. Peace on Earth. Goodwill to men. Except Saddam……Kidding! Saddam too!”
OK, I got carried away with the 12/22 fantasy.
But I don’t think Bush would have put himself in a position to have to step back from the case he had been building for 10 weeks by waiting until December for “assurance” that the evidence on WMD was correct. Remember, Woodward’s account has Bush challenging Tenet that the case is weak.
Why on earth would Bush present the case for 10 solid weeks and only then tell Tenet the case was weak?
Dave…
The brief occured on 21 December, 2002. The invasion began 20 March, 2003, or about 90 days later. For an operation designed to remove a government, occupy a country, and establish a democracy, I feel comfortable calling the “D-90″ point “the eve of war.” You may save that term for 19 March, but I don’t think most people involved in planning would.
At any rate, in looking up those dates I learned that Tenet gave his brief in preparation for Powell’s presentation to the U.N rather than for the invasion. My point stands…Bush was assured by the agency responsible for intelligence that Iraq did indeed have WMD.
Quaker…
What that would mean is that the Bush administration spent 10 weeks making a case for an invasion based on facts they weren t sure of!
Is that really your position?
Is it your position that, after being given the inital assessment however many months before, Bush should never have consulted Tenet on the matter again?
This is a pointless debate. The President consulted the CIA about WMD numerous times over many months, and was assured each time that Iraq had them. End of story.
scratch – at least the Bush administration says that Bush was assured by the agency. Which brings me back to my original point – your faith that this occurred despite the suspicious circumstances. (What proof do you have independent of the Woodward book that it did occur?) Quaker’s point is well taken. Why would the administration be making unequivocal remarks (some of which were quite specific) concerning Iraq WMD’s to the public and to the world when Bush wasn’t sure of his own evidence that it was true? Could it be that equivocal remarks wouldn’t justify war, but rather more inspections? Sorry scratch, aside from your faith based belief in Bush and his administration your explanations just don’t wash.
No.
Neither is it my position that Mr. Bush was seeking “assurance” that the facts he presented to the public were, in fact, accurate.
I think it was you who first suggested that “assurance” was his purpose.
It is my position that this explanation of Mr. Woodward’s account is implausible.
OK, scratch.
Here’s what I can’t put together from your comments.
In the 10 weeks from the Cincinnati speech until just before Christmas, 2002, Mr. Bush and others in the White House repeatedly told us that we knew Saddam had WMD, that there were high level connections between Iraq and terrorist groups, and that Saddam was close to gaining a nuculer weapon.
After making speech after speech in public about this for 10 straignt weeks, Mr. Bush steps back and says, “Hunh. Better make sure I’m right about this.”
Let’s accept that for a moment.
What that would mean is that the Bush administration spent 10 weeks making a case for an invasion based on facts they weren’t sure of!
Is that really your position?
What was the state of the itelligence that Iraq had WMD’s in 2002 that the president and his adminiostration was relying on? From Somerby who quotes the Woodard book: “The intelligence community had a massive amount of intelligence about WMD, he writes, much of it old and not very reliable. What was the actual state of intelligence? The real and best answer was that [Saddam] probably had WMD, but that there was no proof and the case was circumstantial, Woodward writes (his emphasis). Indeed, when he describes the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (the one Condi Rice forgot to finish reading), Woodward says that its conclusions were speculative and showed tentativeness. (For example, when the NIE addressed the question of whether Saddam might aid al Qaeda, it used a triple set of qualifiers. ) The NIE featured words like probably and possibly, Woodward notes. Again this was the state of US intelligence in the months preceding that December briefing.”
I’m trying to figure out how you get to your belief that the agency assured the president each time that Iraq did in fact have WMD’s (especially on the “eve of war”, in your words.) Other than the alleged statement of Tenet what changed? And I hope you’re not saying that we went to war when the intelligence was speculative simply because Tenet said “slam dunk” and no one in the administration checked it out. I’d hate to be your skydiver in that situation.
Dave…
You may very well be right. Two quick points:
Other than the alleged statement of Tenet what changed?
I didn’t suggest that anything had changed. I think he got more or less the same answer every time he was briefed (which, as far as I know, was every day.)
And I hope you re not saying that we went to war when the intelligence was speculative simply because Tenet said slam dunk and no one in the administration checked it out.
First of all, a “slam dunk” does not indicate to me a speculative case. Also, how should someone in the administration check out intelligence, if not by asking the Central Intelligence Agency? Bush has been accused of pre-9/11 inaction because of memos or reports here and there, selected post-attack from among other memos and reports regarding events that never came to pass. But on this issue you apparently want Bush to IGNORE what he was told face to face by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in no uncertain terms. As for what you think Tenet really said or did or believed, don’t forget that he sat directly behind Powell during the brief to the U.N. What do you suppose that means?
Those weren’t quick points after all.
Quaker…
Why on earth would Bush present the case for 10 solid weeks and only then tell Tenet the case was weak?
Bush didn’t tell Tenet the case was weak. He told Tenet that the brief he had just heard, given by someone other than Tenet, was weak. He wanted to included basic facts in simple terms, so that “Joe Everyman,” or some such phrase, could understand it. I think in this and other things you and others have said, you are failing to differentiate between what Bush says in a public address and what he does behind the scenes or in official forums to plan and execute the war. Two very different sets of requirements.
I did enjoy your fantasy, though.
There you go.
My personal opinion is that the “slam dunk” discussion actually happened, but its purpose was something different from what is usually assumed.
And I think you’ve named the real purpose exactly.
I don’t think that Tenet was saying “slam dunk” to try to convince Bush that the evidence of WMD in Iraq was solid. I think he was trying to convince Bush that the presentation of evidence was believable to the public. (I think the words “Joe Sixpack” were reportedly used.)
That casts the conversation in an entirely different light, doesn’t it?
BTW, I’ve actually argued this by email with Somerby. He disagrees with me wholeheartedly. He says that Woodward’s account purports to show Bush taking a hard look at the substance of the argument, not its presentation. Somerby prefers to believe that Woodward is uncritically passing along pretty stories told to him by administration insiders.
As we’ve discussed earlier in this thread, that explanation doesn’t satisfy me.
Come on scratch – I would hope that a sitting president in seeking information before starting a war goes on more than a quote without more, of the case is a “slam dunk” (as an aside apparently it wsan’t since it didn’t convince many in the U.N. or the rest of the world). By checking it out, I mean what specific facts made the case for war? That simple question that could have been asked by anyone sitting in that room where the alleged statement was made. But apparently it wasn’t. The phrase “Slam dunk” was again, apparently enough (assuming such a statement was made) to satisfy everyone. The information presented by Powell to the U.N. was nothing more than what had been known before this alleged meeting. The intel it was based on was characterized as “speculative”. And rather than wanting Bush to ignore what he was told I would like to know what was he told more than the speculative intel that wouldn’t justify going to war? And the “slam dunk” story while convenient simply doesn’t ring true for all the reasons I and others have posted here.
Dave…
Bush was getting daily intelligence briefings from Tenet. The single quote, “slam dunk,” is a convenient summary of Tenet’s information on this subject, but it would be foolish to suggest that those two words were the sum total of his input to the President over those months. Had I known you would cling to those as Bush’s only information, I would have skipped them and just stated the simple fact that Tenet had briefed Bush over a period of months that Saddam still had WMD. Sorry to have wasted your time.
Quaker:
I don t think that Tenet was saying slam dunk to try to convince Bush that the evidence of WMD in Iraq was solid. I think he was trying to convince Bush that the presentation of evidence was believable to the public.
An interesting possibility. Nevertheless, I have seen no indication that Tenet ever told Bush anything other than that Iraq had WMD.
scratch please, don’t for a moment assume or try to snarkily suggest that I have written or believe that “slam dunk” was the sum total of what Bush heard on the subject. YOU are the one who brought it up with the question, “Why would the CIA Director appointed by President Clinton tell his second boss, President Bush, that it was a slam dunk that Iraq had WMD?” One of the things I’m trying to get from you is what is behind this statement if it was made and what was known to change the speculative intel that the administration had been relying on for months to a “slam dunk”? Apparently you don’t know.
Phew. Yes. Back to the topic at hand, eh?
This whole long discussion started over Oliver’s post which talks about the many ways in which Bush administration (and Iraq war) supporters point to the actions of the Clinton administration to justify the belief that Iraq was hiding WMD.
Tenet was, indeed, one source of information on that (regardless of what we separately believe about the “slam dunk” meeting). So was the intelligence consensus inherited from the Clinton administration. There were also many other sources of information available to Mr. Bush and his advisors. Some of that information was conflicting in nature. Some of the information used was of dubious reliability or origin.
A very narrow set of facts was offered to the American public to justify the invasion of Iraq. We’re learning, by way of the Fitzgerald investigation, that an aggressive campaign was waged to discredit critics of the Bush administration’s argument for war.
Let me summarize as plainly as I can:
–the Bush administration ignored intelligence information that didn’t support its argument for war
–the Bush administration didn’t give the American public all the facts
–the Bush administration targeted public figures who disputed the limited facts offered.
You can argue that these assertions are wrong. But I think there’s enough publicly available information to make each assertion worth examining.
That’s why I think Sen. Roberts should keep his promises and proceed with Phase II of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation. We deserve to know how intelligence information was used to decide on an invasion and how it was used to convince the American public and the world that the invasion was justified.
Dave…
what is behind this statement if it was made and what was known to change the speculative intel that the administration had been relying on for months to a slam dunk ? Apparently you don t know.
I don’t think that quote, if it actually occurred, changed ANYTHING. I think it was a reiteration of what the intelligence had been all along. I don’t think Tenet ever told Bush that “We speculate that they might have WMD. I don’t think you know either, so unless you can explain why Tenet told Bush what he did, then sat behind Powell while he presented it to the world, then I don’t see how you can make a case that Powell presented anything other than the best assessment that Tenet had available. The fact is, a lot of GOOD INTELLIGENCE is “speculative.” Pieces of information are collected bit by bit, here and there, until one or many analysts are able to put it together to form a whole picture. Much of the related material is discounted as false. Much of it is meaningless in and of itself.
I get the feeling you’re trying to convince me the intelligence was wrong, while I’m trying to convince you the President should rely on the CIA. Granted, there may have been holes in their analysis or sources or whatever, but while Bush has little experience with those matters, Tenet certainly was very confident in his information, meaning that, as an intelligence professional, he had already considered the simple questions that you suggested Bush should have asked. I would suggest to you that the CIA Director knew the importance of validating sources and weighing differing possible versions of the assessment. Whatever he saw, he was confident that the indication was that Iraq had WMD, and that’s what he shared with the President. Whether the intelligence was right or wrong, I doubt Bush could have asked any simple question, as you proposed, that would have made Tenet say, “You know Mr. President, I hadn’t thought of that. I’ll have to go check that out.” In reality, Tenet would have simply explained his reasoning behind why such a point was either pivotal or irellevant.
scratch – I’m not trying to convince you or anyone that the intelligence was wrong. What I am suggesting is this – in any endeavor in life if someone misrepresented or exaggerated facts they had to argue a case of any sort, it would be unlikely that you or anyone else would believe him or her later. That person’s word would be tainted. Here, it seems quite likely that at least until the alleged December 2002 meeting where Tenet is supposed to have made it clear that the case that Iraq had WMD’s was solid, the Bush administration was making strong and unequivocal statements, most likely misleading statements to the American public. These statements concerned Iraq and WMD’s. You seemed to suggest, at least in your earlier posts that this December meeting was pivotal in Bush’s final decision to go to war. And it’s also implicit from your posts that you believe that even if Bush and others were making misleading or innaccurate statements up to that point, that this meeting made the ultimate decision to go to war ok. It was the final check so to speak. And getting the thumbs up from Tenet, Bush could feel justified about going to war.
My original point (before we got off track) was the case for believing the Tenet story being true was weak. The case for not trusting what the Bush administration said about the necessity of going to war (and for disbelieving this story), is strong especially in light of the misleading statements it had apparently been making all along. That Tenet would come along with his “slam dunk” remarks seems to pat, convenient and scripted to make logical sense.
Sure a lot of good intelligence is wrong. But there is a big difference between relying on flawed intelligence that we don’t know is flawed and manipulating intelligence to suit the needs of an administration. A good case can be made that the Bush administration was guilty of that sort of manipulation.
Dave…
You seemed to suggest, at least in your earlier posts that this December meeting was pivotal in Bush s final decision to go to war. And it s also implicit from your posts that you believe that even if Bush and others were making misleading or innaccurate statements up to that point, that this meeting made the ultimate decision to go to war ok.
I’m looking at a pile of dead horse. How about you?
- I used “slam dunk” as a summary of what Tenet reported to Bush over the months…before and after the December meeting. I don’t know exactly when he said what, of course, but I think it’s quite clear that he believed all along that Iraq had WMD (probably because, among other reasons, he was fairly certain they had or were working on them in 1998, they weren’t completely destroyed, and Saddam never accounted for their destruction.)
In earlier posts I did suggest the meeting was a “final check.” That was before I reviewed the timeline. I now see that Bush was preparing for the UN presentation rather than the invasion. The point is moot, however, because this meeting was one of many at which Tenet presented WMD-related intelligence to Bush. You want to attach great significance to the fact that Tenet gave Bush frequent (daily, in fact) briefings, as if to suggest that there was never a firm and believable answer until the very end. I don’t see it that way…I see it as a continuous series of updates on a critical issue. Imagine the CEO of a shipping company asking, “Are we still having trouble at that railhead?” What, he didn’t know that he was having trouble at that railhead? Why else would he ask unless he didn’t know?
My original point (before we got off track) was the case for believing the Tenet story being true was weak.
You may consider the case weak now, after we’ve had 150,000 troops crawling all over the place, and after we’ve learned more about the people we got the information from. But you haven’t shown why Bush should have, back then, believed some other source over his own senior intelligence executive, nor have you suggested who he should have turned to for a better assessment. I suspect that virtually all sources you might mention (and please do so, if you care to) were known to and evaluated by Tenet’s people, so the question still is, why would Bush believe anyone else over Tenet, without benefit of everything we know now?
Scratch – the Tenet story I referred to was the slam dunk story. If you have the time and patience to go through my posts you will see that s the story that I m attacking as it were. I m saying that in the context of what we now know, that story doesn t make sense. It is a story used by the right, including you in this thread to show how careful Bush was; how everyone believed Iraq had WMD s; how critical and dire the situation was; and how any failures about the decision to go to war were not Bush s fault. Again if you go back and look at my posts, my analogies, arguments etc., were aimed at that particular story. The thrust of my arguments to your posts was aimed at that particular story. It just doesn t ring true. My original premise was that it doesn t ring true because the administration was making unequivocal remarks about Iraq and WMD s even before the slam dunk remark and at a time when they either knew or should have known that there was no basis for such unequivocal statements. From Knight-Ridder 2/6/04: Dubious intelligence about Iraq’s biological weapons programs found its way into the Bush administration’s case for a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq despite the fact that officials warned in May 2002 that some of the information might be unreliable or fabricated.
The state of intelligence was apparently speculative, weak and in some instances at least, unreliable when the administration began making the dire warnings about Iraq and WMD s. Was the president so insulated that he didn t know that the intel was speculative? Were others in his administration to afraid to bring the point up with him? Was everyone so afraid of Iraq that they discounted the speculative nature of the CIA s findings? Was new and better intel uncovered? What changed so that the narrative that Tenet felt the intelligence was a slam dunk is believable? That s the point I ve been trying to make and the question I have been asking you not that Bush shouldn t turn to the CIA or trust the CIA. But rather, in the context of the narrative that Tenet said the intel was a slam dunk, it doesn t make sense nor should it be used to prove anything about what Bush believed or didn t believe before he made the decision to go to war.
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emazikn rjas xhvjkwo atoyzc klxzh sdar vfmthsgqy
emazikn rjas xhvjkwo atoyzc klxzh sdar vfmthsgqy